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n contemporary political theory, one of the most fundamental divides is 
constituted by the dichotomy between transcendence and immanence.  
Among those who are agreed that the currently prevailing political and 
economic conditions stand in need of urgent subversion, there is severe 
disagreement as to how this subversion should be underpinned theoretically.  
Does the invocation of a transcendent realm, principle, or ontology serve to 
overcome current political conditions?  Or, on the contrary, does it only serve to 
reinforce the tyranny of violence and hierarchy from which liberation is sought?  
Thinkers such as Alain Badiou, John Milbank and Slavoj Žižek are all convinced 
that transcendence is a necessary precondition for effective political change.  
This is not to say that their conceptions of this transcendence are the same; 
Milbank's, for instance, is explicitly theological, while Badiou's is avowedly 
atheistic.  Nonetheless, they are agreed that some form of transcendence is 
politically necessary.  On the other hand, the influential political theorists 
Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri are convinced that transcendence is 
something that an emancipatory politics must repudiate, arguing that 
transcendence “leads quickly to the imposition of social hierarchy and 
domination….the refusal of transcendence is the condition of the possibility of 
thinking this immanent power, an anarchic basis of philosophy.”1  This divide 
is clearly deeply pertinent to political theology, for it is difficult to conceive of 
political theology that does not invoke transcendence in some form.  If Hardt 
and Negri's indictment of transcendence could be sustained, then this would 
have very serious implications for the very possibility of political theology as 
such.  But must a political transcendence necessarily be metaphysical? 
Gianni Vattimo's recent book, Nihilism and Emancipation (2004), is written in the 
wake of what might be characterized as the predominant philosophical “event” 
of the twentieth century: the demise of metaphysics.  For Vattimo, one corollary 
of this demise is that it is now impossible to articulate a critical standpoint 
independent of the cultural context within which we are embedded.  For such 
an attempt could only be made on the basis of some “first principle” or 
                                                          
1  Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP, 2000),   
   91-2. 
I 
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foundation which would enact a fall back into metaphysics.  Consequently, the 
only methodological way forward for philosophy is a “descriptive” or 
“sociological” one, with the result that philosophical thought will be “true” in 
so far as it is consistent with and accurately reflects the cultural zeitgeist.  In this 
essay, my aim is to suggest that a necessary corollary of this analysis is that 
philosophy loses its critical capacities.  By definition, such thought will always 
endorse rather than question society.  I further want to suggest this is too high a 
price to pay, not least because of the specific character of contemporary western 
culture.  My response is not to advocate a flight back to metaphysics, which 
would be as undesirable as it is impossible, but rather to question the very 
dichotomy with which Vattimo presents us.  Does a turn away from 
metaphysics necessarily condemn philosophy to thoroughgoing immanence 
and the descriptive and sociological status that Vattimo claims it does?  Or is it 
possible to conceive of an uncoupling of those frequently married concepts: 
metaphysics and transcendence? 
Vattimo says that “a good part, or perhaps even the largest part, of the 
philosophy of the twentieth century takes the form of a sort of ‘sociological 
impressionism’” (4)2, and in order to understand why this is the case, he 
proposes that we play with the two available meanings of the genitive in the 
expression “ontology of actuality.”  Vattimo's translator points out that the 
Italian word l'attualità is being used here is the sense of the French word 
l'actualité, meaning “the present situation in its entirety,” “current affairs,” “the 
state of the world.”3  With this in mind, Vattimo says that the ontology for 
which we are searching “is a theory that speaks of actuality (the objective 
genitive) and also belongs to it in the subjective sense of the genitive” (8).  With 
the demise of metaphysics, “a theory of present existence is a theory that has no 
other source of information or legitimation apart from the present condition 
itself.  And what that means for us, in our search for a way to determine the 
content of the ontology of actuality, is that we must begin by seeing clearly 
what the very fact of the ‘slide’ of philosophy into sociology signifies: the slide 
is the primary constitutive trait of the ‘actuality’ with which we have to deal” 
(8).  The implications of Vattimo's methodology here are clear: if philosophy is 
not exactly synonymous with a simple description of the present situation—it 
does after all claim to interpret it—it  must nonetheless be consistent with, and 
not at odds with, the present situation.  In other words, the logic of such a 
philosophical interpretation must be consistent with and not challenge the logic 
of the present situation.  For to challenge the logic of contemporary culture 
would be to invoke a transcendent metaphysical principle, which is no longer 
available to us.    As Vattimo himself puts it, “having recognized that the 
foundationalism of metaphysics is also responsible for modern rationalization, 
its violence, and its fragmentizing effect on the significance of existence, it is no 
longer possible to think that escape from this condition of ‘alienation’ might be 
                                                          
2 Parenthetical citations refer to Gianni Vattimo, Nihilism and Emancipation (New  
   York: Columbia UP, 2004). 
3 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP, 2000),  
   174. 
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achieved through some kind of ‘critical’ thought, which could only arise 
through reliance upon another first principle, another arché, and thus a 
foundation.  In that case we would still be imprisoned with metaphysics and so 
with modernity and its violence” (11).   
As we have noted, however, if the logic of such thought is consistent with the 
cultural logic of the prevailing zeitgeist, to what extent will such be thought be 
distinct from interpretative description?  And if it turns out to be little more 
than this, then to what extent does this slide from “neutral” description to 
positive endorsement, such that the status quo itself becomes valorized?  
Vattimo himself is not unaware of this danger intrinsic to his proposed 
methodology.  He says that “for philosophy, this entails the risk of becoming 
the apology for whatever is (the radical objection made against Heidegger by 
Adorno in the chapter on 'ontological need' in the Negative Dialectics), but it is a 
risk that has to be run, otherwise the overcoming remains an empty word” (12).  
If this is so, then the next pertinent question is to ask whether the resources for 
overcoming the violence and totalitarianism of modern metaphysics may be 
found within our contemporary cultural situation.  Vattimo says that he follows 
Heidegger in thinking that they can, but that he (Heidegger) never provided a 
sufficient account of this and that, consequently, it remains as a significant gap 
in his thought.  Vattimo interprets this gap as a corollary of the fact that 
Heidegger “never escaped from a vision of technology dominated by the motor 
and mechanical energy” (14), a vision that is now hopelessly out of date.  For 
Vattimo, the possibility of overcoming metaphysics “really opens up only when 
the technology—at any rate the socially hegemonic technology—ceases to be 
mechanical and becomes electronic: information and communication 
technology” (15).  Liberation, for Vattimo, is to be found in the webs and 
networks of our electronic and informational media culture, which promotes a 
view of reality as a “conflict of interpretations.”4  Here strong foundations 
subside, control is relaxed, and interpretations multiply within a milieu that is 
indeterminate and open-ended.  For Vattimo, this is a cultural enactment of 
what he has described as a “weak ontology,” which he believes to be our only 
philosophical means of overcoming metaphysics.  He says that “a weak 
ontology, or better an ontology of the weakening of Being, supplies 
philosophical reasons for preferring a liberal, tolerant, and democratic society 
rather than an authoritarian and totalitarian one” (19).   
But it is my contention that such an analysis is open to question on several 
fronts.  The first and perhaps most important question to be asked is whether 
the invocation of some external, transcendent, or heterogeneous “perspective” 
is necessarily to fall back into metaphysics.  Is it really the case that the 
overcoming of metaphysics condemns us to endless improvisations of 
variations on the “given?”  The argument that this is so really depends upon the 
assumption that to make some appeal to something “other” than our ontology 
of actuality would be to appeal to some independently valid foundation, arché, 
                                                          
4  There is a parallel here with some of Mark C. Taylor's recent work.  See especially  
   Hiding (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1997) and The Moment of Complexity: Emerging  
   Network Culture  (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 2001). 
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or first principle.  But this is itself already to make an assumption about the 
nature or character of this “other,” and it is an assumption that may itself be 
called into question.  It may be instructive here to make some limited 
comparison between Vattimo's work and that of Emmanuel Levinas.  Although 
Levinas never really associated himself with that part of Heidegger's project 
which seeks to “overcome metaphysics,” it is nevertheless well known that for 
Levinas, the “other,” far from being a foundation or first principle, is that which 
exceeds both.  As primordial an-arché, the “other” to which Levinas bears 
witness is that which both makes possible and calls into question every 
foundation and every first principle.  For Levinas, therefore, to discern the trace 
of the other which never appears as such is not to invoke some transcendent 
ontological foundation.  On the contrary, it is to discern the trace of that which 
destabilizes and interrupts all representational pretensions.  As he puts it, “the 
heteronomous experience we seek would be an attitude that cannot be 
converted into a category, and whose movement unto the other is not 
recuperated in identification, does not return to its point of departure.”5 
Now the crucial question that arises from this is whether a thinker like Levinas, 
in invoking a transcendent “other” is, by the very fact of doing so, embroiling 
himself in the very ontological foundation from which he himself is attempting 
to twist free.  In Nihilism and Emancipation, he makes only one fleeting reference 
to Levinas, and that is to accuse his work of harboring “residual ‘metaphysical’ 
elements” (67).  Although Levinas has certainly spoken of a certain 
understanding of metaphysics of desire, the crux of the issue here comes down 
to the question of whether all Levinas's talk of the “other,” the trace, proximity, 
the face and so forth is to install the sort of ontological foundation or first 
principle that Vattimo is so concerned to repudiate.  Vattimo, whose 
“fictionalized” ontology is so central to his overcoming of metaphysics, would 
doubtless want to ask Levinas whether his whole account in Otherwise than 
Being, for instance, is self-consciously a fiction or whether he perceives it to be 
something more or at least something else.  Levinas, in turn, would doubtless 
want to resist reducing his meditations to status of mere fictions; the “other” of 
which he writes, after all, exceeds and makes possible the distinction between 
fact and fiction, and the desire to reduce his thought to the status of either one 
or the other would be, for him, symptomatic of that which he himself is seeking 
to overcome.  Meanwhile, for Vattimo,  Levinas's refusal to admit frankly that 
his “speculations” are nothing more than fictions, would be evidence of 
Levinas's own failure to absorb the implications of the “event” of the 
weakening of Being.   
It would appear that at this point we have reached a bedrock position, where 
the argument would end, and deadlock would ensue.  As Wittgenstein has 
observed, there comes a point in all arguments where reasons have been 
exhausted, and one is left with the simple statement of one's position.6  But if 
                                                          
5  Emmanuel Levinas, “The Trace of the Other” in Mark C. Taylor (ed.),  
   Deconstruction in Context: Literature and Philosophy (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1986),  
   348. 
6  See Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty, tr. Denis Paul and G. E. M. Anscombe   
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this is so, then Wittgenstein also points to a way out of this deadlock in at least 
two senses.  First, when rational argument comes to an end, one resorts to 
persuasion; one simply persuades one's interlocutor to look at the world this 
way rather than that, to regard this form of philosophy as being more 
foundational than the other.  Secondly, in order to discover what people 
believe, we should look less at what they tell us about what they believe and 
more at that to which their beliefs give rise, to look at the whole context within 
which their beliefs get their sense.  I want to employ this double 
Wittgensteinian strategy here both to persuade that to invoke a transcendent 
other does not necessarily imply a metaphysical move in the way that Vattimo 
thinks it does, and, furthermore, by employing the second Wittgensteinian 
move, I intend to show how Vattimo's philosophical methodology gives rise to 
concepts and ideas that are more metaphysical than anything to be found in 
Levinas, and that this is particularly evident in his understanding of ethical 
subjectivity. 
If we were to ask what it means for ethical and political subjectivity to make the 
shift from a metaphysical to a post-metaphysical condition, central to what 
would undoubtedly be a long, complex and contested answer would be that it 
entails a reorientation of the subject from a primarily nominative to a primarily 
accusative mode of existence.  In the nominative mode, the human subject is 
discrete and autonomous.  The assumption is that this subject is not ethically 
“prejudiced,” but stands neutrally in an imaginary ethical vacuum, in need of a 
philosophical and ethical system which, when demonstrated to be rationally 
valid, will inform that subject of what is right and wrong, good and evil and of 
how it should act in all possible circumstances.7  In an accusative mode, by 
contrast, the human subject is from the very outset subject to and, indeed, 
constituted by a call of responsibility for the other that precedes all thought, 
reflection, and philosophy.  This call is subsequently articulated in ethics and 
philosophy and not vice versa.  We may question, however, whether the 
concept of ethical subjectivity we find in Vattimo's philosophy had indeed 
made this shift.   
Certainly, Vattimo explicitly sets himself against metaphysical ethics.  Once 
again, we see that he rejects an ethical system based upon foundations and first 
principles and instead seek one that is reflective of our current condition.  “To 
correspond to the times,” he says, “is a responsible form of commitment; so 
even here a form of obligation subsists, which allows us to speak of a rationality 
and an ethicality, meaning a commitment to derive logical consequences and 
practical imperatives from certain ‘principles’ (here used merely in the sense of 
points of departure)” (39).  He then goes on to anticipate the objection I am 
about to elaborate when he says that “some may protest that this just repeats 
the pattern of metaphysical ethics: you recognize the principles, articulate them 
                                                                                                                                         
   (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1969),  602-20, 79-82. 
7  This is an assumption commonly found in analytical ethical philosophy, such as  
   that propounded by John Rawls and Alan Gewirth, for instance.  For a discussion  
   and criticism of this approach, see Edith Wyschogrod, Saints and Postmodernism:  
   Revisioning Moral Philosophy (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1990),  65-72. 
HYMAN: Political Theology 
 
JCRT 8.3 (Fall 2007) 
130 
rationally, then derive guidelines for actions from them” (39).  He concedes that 
such an objection would be “perfectly correct,” but that the metaphysical 
mechanism is here both taken up and distorted in the manner of Heideggerian 
Verwindung.  But the question remains of just how much distortion Vattimo 
effects and whether any Verwindung is really accomplished. 
For the ethical and political subject at the heart of Vattimo's “ethics of 
provenance” is very much the modern neutral ethical subject standing in need 
of principles and guidelines for action to tell her how to behave.  The picture 
here is still of a subject who stands in subsequent need of ethical guidance 
rather than a subject who is constituted from the very outset by an ethical 
calling.  We have already quoted him above when he said that “a weak 
ontology, or better an ontology of the weakening of Being, supplies 
philosophical reasons for preferring a liberal, tolerant, and democratic society 
rather than an authoritarian and totalitarian one” (19).  So our ethical and 
political commitments are still ones that need “philosophical reasons” upon 
which they can rest.  Ethics and politics still stand in need of a philosophical 
justification, even if this justification is provided by an “ontology of actuality” 
rather than metaphysical principles.  For Vattimo, ethics is secondary in the 
sense that it is something we develop or invent by means of our own “choices” 
and “decisions.”  So with respect to our “heritage and provenance,” our 
inherited traditions, we have to make informed choices about what to retain 
and what to reject.  These are what Vattimo calls “‘philological choices’: What to 
retain actively and what to exclude from the core of ideas, values, ‘principles’ of 
which we consider ourselves the heirs and by which we feel ourselves 
summoned?  These choices must be made through acts of responsible 
interpretive recognition” (45).  How do we decide whether or not such 
principles are still valid?  Vattimo says that this is “something to be decided in 
light of the criterion that, with a responsible interpretation, we take to be 
characteristic of whatever ‘really’ forms part of the legacy to which we feel 
ourselves committed” (46).  For Vattimo, of course, this criterion is to be found 
in nihilism, in the “dissolution of ultimate foundations.”  But the important 
point for the time being is that Vattimo appears to be assuming here, 
throughout his exposition of an “ethics of provenance,” a modern metaphysical 
subject that stands in need of deconstruction.  In spite of its ostensible rejection 
of metaphysical first principles, it remains, in ethical terms, a subject that is 
actively founding rather than a subject that is passively founded.  In other 
words, it remains a nominative rather than an accusative subject.  In so far as 
this is the case, we must question the effectiveness of Vattimo's professed 
subversion of metaphysics and the extent to which he has effected an 
accomplished Verwindung.  His account of ethical subjectivity here remains the 
most incongruous and glaring instance of a metaphysical residue.  
Paradoxically, therefore, it seems that although he rejects the return of the 
“other” so as to avert a relapse back into metaphysics, we actually find that it is 
this very refusal that cultivates a metaphysical residue. 
There are, however, other problematical elements of Vattimo's ethical 
philosophy which both arise from and reveal a certain metaphysical remnant.  
We have already observed that for Vattimo, ethics, and politics must still 
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somehow be derived from philosophy and be philosophically justified.  And we 
have also observed that he derives his ethics from a nihilistic ontology—
because it is the ontology most attuned to the spirit of the times.  The ethical 
content that is derived from a nihilistic ontology is simply stated: it is “the 
exclusion of violence that thinks itself legitimate and the exclusion of the violent 
refusal to be questioned, the authoritarian silencing of the other in the name of 
first principles” (46).  On the basis of this principle, our whole ethical heritage is 
to be judged.  Although there is nothing ethically objectionable in this principle 
itself, this whole methodological procedure is deeply problematic (and, I should 
argue, residually metaphysical) in at least three ways.   
First of all, if it is the case that our ethics and philosophy must be consistent 
with the spirit of the times because there are now no metaphysical first 
principles with which to challenge the direction of this spirit, it must also be 
recognised, on the same basis, that the direction and path of our cultural 
zeitgeist is wholly contingent.  Rejecting, as Vattimo would, any Hegelian notion 
of teleology, it must be recognised that the movement of the spirit of the times, 
if not arbitrary, is at least unpredictable.  If ethics and political philosophy must 
follow wherever culture and society leads, then on Vattimo's own criteria, there 
are no methodological reasons for resistance, even if society were to move in a 
direction that is, on the basis of Vattimo's own current metaethical principle, 
unambiguously malign.  Indeed, it may well be the case that this is not only a 
hypothetical and potential difficulty, and this leads me on to my second point. 
As the title of Vattimo's book makes clear, he sees an indelible link between 
“nihilism” and “emancipation.”  Nihilism frees us from violence and tyranny 
because it no longer provides us with any legitimation, foundation, or 
justification for the enforcement of such violence and tyranny.  But to what 
extent is this really the case?  To what extent may nihilism be read otherwise?  
The answer to this question must surely be: to a very great extent, as a mere 
cursory glance at the literature on the subject will tell us.  Legion are the 
voices—philosophical, critical, sociological, ethical, and theological—who 
interpret nihilism not as emancipatory but as malign, tyrannous, even, in some 
cases, fascist.  These voices are both influential and well known.  Mark C. 
Taylor, developing the insights of Jean Baudrillard, draws an analogy between 
the demise of the gold standard and the death of God.  In each case the 
disappearance of the transcendental signified gave rise to a free play of 
currencies in one case and of meanings in the other.  The point he is making is 
that there is a common logic at work in philosophical nihilism on the one hand 
and economic capitalism on the other.8  Fredric Jameson similarly sees 
philosophical nihilism and postmodern culture alike as being expressions of the 
cultural logic of late capitalism.9  From a theological perspective, John Milbank 
sees an ontology of nihilism as promoting an ethics of violence, tyranny and, 
                                                          
8  See Jean Baudrillard, Symbolic Exchange and Death (London: Sage Publications, 1993)  
   and Mark C. Taylor, About Religion: Economies of Faith in Virtual Culture (Chicago: U  
   of Chicago P, 1999), especially chapter 6. 
9  See, for instance, Fredric Jameson, The Cultural Turn: Selected Writings on the  
   Postmodern, 1983-1998 (London: Verso, 1998). 
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ultimately, fascism, and he too sees this ontology as being given its economic 
expression in capitalism.10  These thinkers (and it should be noted that they are 
illustrative rather than exhaustive) are by no means compatible with each other, 
neither in their methodologies nor in their conclusions, but what they do share 
in common is their conviction that nihilism, far from being empancipatory, is 
deeply malign.  This is a serious challenge, and it is one that Vattimo does not 
adequately address.  He remains convinced that an ontology of nihilism is the 
best defence against the emergence of a 'war of all against all' because it 
provides no 'positive reasons', no legitimation, no foundation for the violent 
domination or abuse of others.  But if nihilism provides no “positive reasons” 
for the violent domination or abuse of others, it might just as easily be said that 
nihilism provides no “positive reasons” for the resistance of such domination 
and abuse.  It could be argued that, applied consistently, the logic of nihilism 
provides no legitimation for any principles of action—whether benign or 
malign.  A crucial move here, as I have suggested elsewhere, is to distinguish 
between a “metaphysical” nihilism and an “accomplished” or “fictional” 
nihilism.  An accomplished nihilism, that is a nihilism that has relinquished all 
metaphysical pretensions, is one that recognizes that its own perspective shares 
in the same fictional, perspectival and relative status that it ascribes to 
everything else.  Thus understood (and Vattimo has himself argued for such an 
understanding of nihilism), I should argue that nihilism could not be seen as in 
any sense putting forward an ontology or an ethics.  Unlike metaphysical 
nihilism, it is not making any claim about “the way the world is”; rather it is 
more like an acknowledgement of the impossibility of making any definitive 
claim about the “way the world is.”  Consequently, it cannot make any claim 
that one ethics is more natural, spontaneous, justified, or consistent than 
another.  An accomplished nihilism does not prescribe any particular ethics but, 
rather, opens the way towards particular ethical commitments, ethical 
traditions, or ethical narratives.11  This would be one way of responding to 
some of the critics just mentioned, a way of reconciling commitment to a 
nihilistic disposition on the one hand with a denial that such a commitment in 
itself entails malign ethical prescriptions on the other.  But this is a route 
Vattimo does not want to take.  For he still remains wedded to the old 
metaphysical procedure whereby ethics is derived from philosophy, where 
nihilism provides “good reasons” for preferring liberal democracy and respect 
for the other over totalitarianism and tyranny.  But the difficulty here is that it is 
by no means self-evident that nihilism does indeed provide such “good 
reasons.”  For a metaphysical nihilism (which, admittedly, Vattimo wants to 
move beyond), there are strong arguments to the effect that it actually promotes 
a malign, totalitarian, violent ethics.  For an accomplished post-metaphysical 
nihilism, there are strong arguments to the effect that it does not promote any 
particular form of ethics at all. 
                                                          
10 See, for instance, John Milbank, Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason  
   (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990). 
11  I have argued this in Gavin Hyman, The Predicament of Postmodern Theology: Radical  
   Orthodoxy or Nihilist Textualism?  (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2001),  
   chapter 5.  As I there make clear, my argument for an “accomplished” or “fictional”  
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There is, however, yet another metaphysical remnant in Vattimo's political 
philosophy which may end up by unwittingly promoting the very 
totalitarianism he is concerned to resist.  In his chapter, “Liberty and Peace in 
the Postmodern Condition,” Vattimo avers that “the reconciliation of peace and 
liberty in the postmodern or late-modern world will be attained only on 
condition that esthetics prevails over objective truth.  The variety of lifestyles 
and diversity of ethical codes will be able to coexist without bloody clashes only 
if they are considered as, precisely, styles, not reciprocally exclusive but 
compatible, like the artistic styles within an art collection....” (58). The logic of 
Vattimo's thought here is clear. In a world of conflicting outlooks, philosophies, 
religions, metanarratives and ethical codes, if the respective adherents of these 
various worldviews claim that their own positions are metaphysically true, this 
will only lead to the mutual and violent imposition of these perspectives upon 
others.  He says that “it may have been possible to believe in unique truth and 
morality in traditional closed societies, founded on a single source of authority 
and a single tradition; today it has become too dangerous to think like that....” 
(58). But there are a number of philosophical moves being made here.  On the 
one hand, Vattimo is making a pragmatic argument about how best to 
“regulate” the empirical fact of conflicting and competing worldviews that 
coexist in the world.  He is asking the question of how we may best ensure that 
such global differences in outlook do not boil over into aggression, violence, 
and war.  But this is not, of course, the only move being made here.  Vattimo's 
specific solution—that we should be “ironic” (in Richard Rorty's sense) towards 
our inhabited traditions and treat them more in the manner of “artistic styles” 
than as claims to truth—is derived from a particular philosophical tradition or 
worldview, namely, that of nihilism.  So what Vattimo is actually doing is 
precisely that which he wishes to avoid: the elevation of one particular tradition 
(in this case, that of nihilism) and imposing this upon all other traditions, the 
acceptance of which appears to be a condition of their continued existence.  It is 
far from clear, of course, why other traditions would wish (or think it just) to 
interpret their own traditions in a way that is consistent with western 
hermeneutical nihilism and why this should be elevated above all other 
traditions.  Once again, of course, Vattimo would explicitly reject the claim that 
hermeneutical nihilism is “truer” than other traditions, such a recourse being 
ruled out in the wake of the death of God.  But it is significant and telling that in 
spite of this repudiation, Vattimo nonetheless ends up by repeating this 
classically metaphysical (and in this case liberal) gesture: allow a multiplicity of 
worldviews to exist, provided that they all pay homage to an overarching 
western framework.  As usual with this gesture, a rhetoric of tolerance, 
liberalism and peace masks a violent and imperialistic imposition.   
One recourse for Vattimo might be to say that he is not advocating that the 
world traditions understand themselves in this way because hermeneutical 
nihilism is “truer” or “better” than other traditions, but simply as a matter of 
pure and urgent pragmatics.  Given the world in which we currently live, with 
its resurgent fundamentalisms and spates of extreme violence, we have an 
                                                                                                                                         
   nihilism (as opposed to a “metaphysical” nihilism) was itself indebted to Gianni  
   Vattimo's own work. 
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urgent practical need to seek some solution, albeit transitional or impermanent, 
that will avoid pending disaster.  The challenge identified here is certainly a 
real and urgent one, but such an answer would again reveal a certain 
metaphysical residue.  For it seems to assume a dichotomy between on the one 
hand traditions that consider themselves “true” in a foundational sense, with 
the dangers of violence and tyranny that that brings and on the other hand, 
traditions that regard themselves ironically in the manner of “works of art” or 
as fictions, with the impulse towards imposition consequently dissolved.  But 
again, this is a peculiarly western and metaphysical dichotomy.  It refuses to 
consider the possibility of an “other” that might break up and transcend such a 
dichotomy.  Is it possible for a tradition to be utterly serious (and non-ironic) 
about its ultimacy and authority without it being prone to the absolutism, 
tyranny and violence that metaphysical truth seems to bring?  In other words, is 
it possible for a tradition to be free of the shackling antinomy that western 
metaphysics seems to impose?  I should suggest that it is, although the 
articulation of such a vision is not one that can be entered into here.  But the 
important point is that in seeking a post-metaphysical articulation of liberty and 
peace in the postmodern world, Vattimo advocates one particular horn of a 
metaphysical dilemma, rather than looking beyond that dilemma altogether. 
Indeed, the antinomy within which Vattimo appears to be trapped here seems 
to echo the very dilemma with which we began this discussion.  There we saw 
him caught between a cultural criticism based on metaphysical first principles 
on the one hand and a philosophical slide towards sociological description on 
the other.  Faced with this choice, he endorses philosophy's sociological slide 
and repudiates the intervention of any transcendent other, lest this deliver him 
over to the other horn of his dilemma.  But what if the interruption of such 
transcendence, far from condemning him to one alternative in this antinomy 
actually delivered him from it altogether?  What if Vattimo's refusal of 
transcendence, far from protecting him from metaphysics actually reveals his 
own continuing indebtedness to it?  Indeed, my burden in this essay has been to 
argue precisely that.  I have argued that in several different ways, Vattimo's 
ethical and political philosophy is marked by the trace of a residual 
metaphysics.  Furthermore, I suggest that these metaphysical traces all stem 
from his refusal of a transcendent other, which alone could deliver him from 
them.  In effect, therefore, this essay also constitutes a plea for the return of 
transcendence in any ethical and political philosophy which not only seeks a 
Verwindung with regard to metaphysics but also seeks to be robustly critical 
with respect to the spirit of the times.12 
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12  I am very grateful to Jeffrey W. Robbins for his insightful comments on an earlier 
version of this essay, particularly with regard to the discussion of Levinas. 
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